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Abstract
The proliferation of speech technologies and rising privacy leg-
islation calls for the development of privacy preservation solu-
tions for speech applications. These are essential since speech
signals convey a wealth of rich, personal and potentially sen-
sitive information. Anonymisation, the focus of the recent
VoicePrivacy initiative, is one strategy to protect speaker iden-
tity information. Pseudonymisation solutions aim not only to
mask the speaker identity and preserve the linguistic content,
quality and naturalness, as is the goal of anonymisation, but
also to preserve voice distinctiveness. Existing metrics for
the assessment of anonymisation are ill-suited and those for
the assessment of pseudonymisation are completely lacking.
Based upon voice similarity matrices, this paper proposes the
first intuitive visualisation of pseudonymisation performance
for speech signals and two novel metrics for objective assess-
ment. They reflect the two, key pseudonymisation requirements
of de-identification and voice distinctiveness.
Index Terms: pseudonymisation, anonymisation, privacy
preservation, VoicePrivacy
1. Introduction
The ubiquity and proliferation of speech technologies and the
increase in data protection regulation such as the European Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [1] has fueled inter-
ests in privacy preservation solutions for speech data [2]. There
are two general strategies: encryption and anonymisation. En-
cryption is applied to protect speech data from interception and
eavesdropping. Anonymisation aims to ensure that the pro-
tected speech data cannot be linked to the original speaker.
With very few solutions having been proposed, and with the
few existing solutions achieving only modest levels of anonymi-
sation, the VoicePrivacy initiative1 [3] was launched in 2019 to
promote the consideration of privacy and to foster progress in
privacy preservation. VoicePrivacy takes the form of a chal-
lenge in which participants are tasked with the development of
anonymisation solutions to (i) suppress (as much as possible)
the speaker identity from an utterance while nonetheless pre-
serving voice distinctiveness and (ii) leave intact (as much as
possible) the linguistic content, quality and naturalness. The
requirement for voice distinctiveness implies that anonymised
voices remain distinguishable and that all utterances from the
same original speaker are anonymised with the same pseu-
dovoice. Such a requirement avoids confusion between speak-
ers during a dialogue session and thus allows speaker diariza-
tion. We hence refer to the process to meet all these require-
ments as pseudonymisation.
1https://voiceprivacychallenge.org
While VoicePrivacy stands to make substantial inroads, it
is clear that the metrics used to assess pseudonymisation per-
formance are far from being straightforward; they must reflect
multifaceted criteria. The work in this paper is concerned with
metrics that reflect criteria related exclusively to the speaker
identity; it is not concerned with complementary metrics for as-
sessing the preservation of linguistic content etc. Most of the
prior work including VoicePrivacy, e.g. [3, 4, 5], measures pri-
vacy using trivial, generic metrics such as the Equal Error Rate
(EER) estimated from Automatic Speaker Verification (ASV)
experiments. The general idea is to gauge performance by com-
paring the EER using original speech data to that obtained using
speech data after de-identification; the greater the difference, or
the higher the EER, the better the de-identification and privacy.
Despite its simplicity and ease of interpretablity, the EER
is ill-suited as a measure of privacy. Principally, this is because
the EER reflects the perspectives of an evaluator and not those
of a privacy adversary. While a framework to overcome these
issues is proposed in [6], it addresses only one component of
the pseudonymisation problem, namely that relating specifically
to de-identification; it does not reflect voice distinctiveness. A
solution to address both, i.e. a solution for the assessment of
pseudonymisation, is the novel contribution in this paper.
We propose two pseudonymisation metrics for the assess-
ment of de-identification and of voice distinctiveness. Voice
similarity matrices, upon which the two objective metrics
are inspired, provide easily-interpretable visualisations of any
speaker-dependent pseudonymisation behaviour and perfor-
mance. First, with a widely established privacy preservation
terminology currently lacking, we provide definitions of de-
identification and voice distinctiveness. We then present voice
similarity matrices and show how the two metrics are derived
from them. Finally, we present the results of pseudonymisation
experiments performed using the VoicePrivacy 2020 data sets
and baseline systems.
2. Pseudonymisation
Many of the terms used in privacy research are ill-defined or
at least lack a shared understanding within the speech commu-
nity. We define here more precisely the two requirements for
pseudonymisation, how they relate to other terms referred to in
the literature and how our work relates to them. The require-
ments are as follows.
• De-identification: a process to conceal in a speech utter-
ance the true speaker identity [7, 8, 9], also referred to as
speaker identity masking [10] or voice disguise [11, 12].
• Voice distinctiveness: de-identified voices should re-
main distinguishable within one session (e.g. a single
teleconference) such that different speakers still have
different, but consistent voices, i.e. protected utterances
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produced by the same speaker should be mutually link-
able within a session, but they should not be linkable to
the original unprotected voice. Moreover, pseudovoices
should not be linkable between pseudonymised sessions
but this aspect is not assessed in this work. Voice distinc-
tiveness is different to voice-indistinguishability, a term
coined in [13]. The latter refers specifically and only to
the unlinkability between original and protected voices.
Both anonymisation and pseudonymisation are defined
within the European GDPR [1]. The GDPR specifies that
anonymisation should be irreversible whereas pseudonymisa-
tion involves the replacement of an identity with a pseudo-
identity. Thus in our speech pseudonymisation framework,
the mapping between unprotected and protected voices should
be injective (one-to-one mapping) in order to produce distinct
pseudovoices. Hence, the pseudonymisation mapping may be
reversible (at least in a single session) which is incompatible
with the irreversibility requirement for anonymisation.
This paper proposes visualisations and metrics to assess the
level of de-identification, i.e. the uncertainty in the linkability
between a given utterance and the speaker identity, and the level
to which voice distinctiveness is altered in the protected space.
Each speaker should have their own protected voice. In terms
of established speech research terms, speaker diarization should
perform similarly in both unprotected and protected domains.
3. Voice Similarity Matrices, a Visualisation
This section describes voice similarity matrices for the assess-
ment of pseudonymisation according to the two requirements
of de-identification and voice distinctiveness. These matrices
are similar to conventional confusion matrices except that they
are formed with classification scores resulting from the exhaus-
tive comparison of utterances collected from a set of speakers.
Scores take the form of posterior probabilities, a visualisation
of which is provided in the form of a heatmap.
3.1. Voice Similarity Matrix
Let lr(x, y) denote the likelihood-ratio score from the compar-
ison of two speech segments x and y. Assuming equal priors, it
is expressed in terms of the posterior probabilities:
lr(x, y) =
P (Htar|x, y)
P (Himp|x, y) (1)
where Htar is the target proposition (x and y were uttered by the
same speaker) and where Himp is the complementary impostor
proposition. Scores, usually in the form of the log-likelihood-
ratio (llr), can be calibrated [14] in order to produce so-called
oracle scores. The latter are used to compute the voice similar-
ity which, for two speakers i and j, we define as:
S(i, j) = sigmoid
 ∑
1≤k≤ni
1≤l≤nj
llr(x
(i)
k , x
(j)
l )
ninj
 (2)
which represents the posterior of the averaged llr, where
x
(p)
q is the q-th segment of the p-th speaker, np is the num-
ber of segments from the p-th speaker and sigmoid(y) =
(1 + exp−y)−1. For i = j, scores for which k = l are re-
moved from the average in (2) in order to avoid the considera-
tion of identical speech segments which could lead to an over-
estimated similarity. While the average in (2) operates upon
O P
O
P
(a)
O P
O
P
(b)
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
S
(i
,j
)
O P
O
P
(c)
Figure 1: Three artificial similarity matrices. The upper-left
matrix is MOO, the upper-right and lower-left are MOP whereas
the lower-right is MPP.
log-likelihood-ratios, use of the sigmoid function yields voice
similarity scores in posterior probability space. The voice sim-
ilarity matrix M is then given by M = (S(i, j))1≤i≤N,1≤j≤N
where N is the number of speakers. An example voice simi-
larity matrix is illustrated in the top-left quadrant of Fig. 1a.
The horizontal (left-to-right) and vertical axes (top-to-bottom)
indicate the speaker indices i and j for N = 10 speakers. In
this example, the diagonal elements depict the dominant aver-
age similarity between same-speaker utterances, i.e. target trial
comparisons that result in a higher S(i, j). The off-diagonal el-
ements depict lower average similarity between different speak-
ers, i.e. impostor trial comparisons that result in a lower S(i, j).
3.2. Visualisation of pseudonymisation performance
We now explain how voice similarity matrices are used to as-
sess pseudonymisation systems. Pseudonymisation is applied
to transform a set of original speech segments (O) to a set of
protected, pseudonymised speech segments (P). We then de-
fine four voice similarity matrices. MOO and MPP reflect voice
similarity within the original and pseudonymised speech seg-
ment sets. The other two, MOP and MPO, reflect the voice
similarity between the original and the pseudonymised sets.
MOP = (MPO)
> where (·)> denotes the transpose operator.
However, as the voice similarity S is assumed to be symmetric,
all matrices are symmetric and MOP = MPO. In the remainder
of this paper, we hence refer only to MOO, MOP and MPP.
Fig. 1 shows three example similarity matrices. In each
case, MOO is in the upper-left quadrant, MOP is in the
upper-right quadrant and MPP is in the lower-right quadrant.
Fig. 1a illustrates the impact upon voice similarity of a poor
pseudonymisation system; voice similarities between origi-
nal, pseudonymised and original-pseudonymised segments are
more-or-less identical. Pseudomynisation achieves nothing,
even if voice distinctiveness is preserved (MPP still exhibits a
dominant diagonal). Fig. 1b illustrates the behaviour of a dif-
ferent pseudonymisation system for which voice distinctiveness
is lost (there is no dominant diagonal in MPP). This system,
however, is more successful in de-identification (MOP also has
no dominant diagonal). Fig. 1c visualises the performance of
an ideal case in which both de-identification and voice distinc-
tiveness criteria are met: MOP is uniform without a dominant
diagonal; MPP does exhibit a dominant diagonal.
The three M matrices serve to visualise any differences
in pseudonymisation performance at the speaker level. While
these are not apparent in the artificial examples in Fig. 1,
since ASV performance typically varies across different speak-
ers [15, 16], they are expected in practice for real speech data
(see Section 5.2). We show next how the visualisations shown
in Fig. 1 can be used to derive objective measures of both de-
identification and voice distinctiveness.
4. Proposed Metrics
MOO and MPP show voice distinctiveness in original and
pseudonymised space respectively, while MOP shows the ease
with which speakers in original space can be linked to speakers
in pseudonymised space (and vice versa). This information is
most easily visualised by the presence or absence of a domi-
nant diagonal. Accordingly, a measure of de-identification and
voice distinctiveness can be captured by quantification of diag-
onal dominance: the key idea behind both proposed metrics.
For any of the three M matrices, the diagonal dominance
Ddiag(M) is defined as the absolute difference between the av-
erages of the diagonal and the off-diagonal elements:
Ddiag(M)=
∣∣∣( ∑
1≤i≤N
S(i, i)
N
)
−
( ∑
1≤j≤N
1≤k≤N
j 6=k
S(j, k)
N(N − 1)
)∣∣∣ (3)
Ddiag will be 0 for a constant/uniform matrix and 1 for an iden-
tity matrix as well as for a matrix where all diagonal elements
are 0 and all off-diagonal elements are 1.
4.1. De-identification
A measure of de-identification performance is obtained from
the comparison of Ddiag in the original space to that between the
original and pseudonymised space. Assuming that Ddiag(MOO)
is strictly positive and that Ddiag(MOP) ≤ Ddiag(MOO) (de-
identification should always reduce the diagonal dominance in
MOP), then de-identification performance is measured accord-
ing to:
DeID = 1− Ddiag(MOP)
Ddiag(MOO)
(4)
The denominator acts to normalise Ddiag(MOP) so that a
pseudonymisation solution that does nothing will yield a DeID
of 0%. Conversely, if the de-identification is optimal, i.e.
Ddiag(MOP) = 0, then DeID = 100%.
4.2. Voice distinctiveness
Pseudonymisation can both degrade or improve voice distinc-
tiveness. Motivated from electrical engineering and signal pro-
cessing, we report a gain value on a decibel (dB) scale as fol-
lows:
GVD = 10 log10
(Ddiag(MPP)
Ddiag(MOO)
)
(5)
Gains above 0 dB indicate an increase in voice distinctive-
ness. Gains below 0 dB indicate a degradation whereas a value
of exactly 0 dB indicates that voice distinctiveness in original
space is preserved in pseudonymised space.
5. Pseudonymisation, a Case Study
In this section we present an analysis of pseudonymisation per-
formance using the proposed matrices and the de-identification
and voice distinctiveness metrics.2
5.1. Data sets, protocols and baselines
This work was performed using the VoicePrivacy Challenge
2020 [3] data sets and the two associated baseline systems. The
primary baseline, inspired from [17], is based on a x-vector
pooling and neural waveform model resynthesis approach. The
2The matrices and metrics are integrated in the VoicePrivacy Chal-
lenge: https://github.com/Voice-Privacy-Challenge.
# Official name Short name
1 libri dev trials f ldtf
2 libri dev trials m ldtm
3 vctk dev trials f vdtf
4 vctk dev trials m vdtm
5 vctk dev trials f common vdtfc
6 vctk dev trials m common vdtmc
Table 1: Renaming of the development sets presented in [21].
secondary baseline is based on vocal tract filter transformations
using McAdams coefficients [18].
Results are reported for the VoicePrivacy 2020 development
data sets. They are drawn from LibriSpeech-dev-clean [19] and
VCTK-dev [20]. We use the trial parts of the challenge devel-
opment data sets. Details of both data sets and baselines can
be found in [21]. For brevity, the sets are renamed as shown in
Tab. 1.
As per challenge conditions, scores are obtained from the
comparison of x-vectors [22] using probabilistic linear discrim-
inant analysis [23]. Each of the three score sets used for the
computation of the three similarity matrices are oracle cali-
brated [14].
5.2. Pseudonymisation assessment results
Fig. 2 provides separate visualisations of pseudonymisation
performance for three of the data sets. They show that the
primary baseline (left column) delivers better de-identification
performance than the secondary baseline (right column). For
the primary baseline, entries in MOP (upper-right and lower-
left quadrants) have values close to 0.5, indicating strong de-
identification. In contrast, MOP matrices for the secondary
baseline show perceptible diagonals, indicating weaker de-
identification. The same visualisations show that the secondary
baseline better preserves voice distinctiveness; diagonals in
MPP matrices (lower-right quadrants) are more perceptible for
the secondary than the primary baseline.
Some differences in performance across speakers and data
sets are also visible in Fig. 2. For the primary baseline, voice
distinctiveness seems to be slightly better for ldtf and vdtmc
data than for vdtm data (more distinctive diagonals in MPP ma-
trices). While de-identification appears to be consistent for the
primary baseline, the secondary baseline appears to perform
slightly better for vdtm data than for ldft and vdtmc data, al-
beit it still poorly. De-identification performance is also seen to
depend on the speaker, e.g. there are visible striations in MOP
for the secondary baseline and vdtm and vdtmc data and, to a
much lesser extent, for the primary baseline and ldtf data. The
resulting voice distinctiveness also depends on the speaker, e.g.
for the secondary baseline, the pseudovoice of one speaker in
ldtf is notably more distinctive than others (pure yellow row
and column apart the diagonal element in MPP).
DeID and GVD results for each data set and for the
primary (blue triangles) and secondary (red squares) baselines
are shown in Fig. 3 and Tab. 2. DeID rates for the primary
baseline are consistently close to 100%, whereas those for
the secondary baseline vary between approximately 44% and
93%. GVD rates for the secondary baseline are consistently
close to zero, whereas those for the primary baseline vary
between approximately -7.5 and -13 dB. Such substantial
degradations to voice distinctiveness in comparison to the
secondary baseline are no surprise since the primary baseline is
primary baseline secondary baseline
set DeID [%] GVD [dB] DeID [%] GVD [dB]
ldtf 99.54 -9.19 55.41 -1.06
ldtm 100 -8.66 41.23 -1.19
vdtf 99.61 -8.71 93.26 -3.60
vdtm 100 -12.66 71.19 -2.98
vdtfc 99.51 -7.46 84.09 -1.39
vdtmc 99.96 -10.30 43.87 -0.81
Table 2: Results of De-Identification and Gain of Voice Distinc-
tiveness for both baselines and each set.
based upon x-vector averaging over a subset of speakers. These
objective results confirm observations from the visualisations
in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2: Voice similarity matrices for the two baselines on ldtf,
vdtm and vdtmc.
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Figure 3: Scatter plot of Gain of Voice Distinctiveness (GVD) vs.
De-Identification (DeID) for both baselines and each set.
6. Conclusions
This paper describes an approach to visualise the de-
identification and voice distinctiveness delivered by
pseudonymisation solutions and defines objective metrics.
Voice similarity matrices, upon which the visualisations and
metrics are based, provide revealing, snapshot insights into
pseudonymisation performance. They expose differences in
performance across different data and speakers. For the latter,
visualisations show that, while a particular pseudonymisation
solution might perform well on average, it might leave some
subjects with relatively weak protection, a finding which
is not evident from results derived from objective metrics
alone. Other findings point towards a possible trade-off or
compromise between de-identification and voice distinctive-
ness. One pseudonymisation solution delivers near-to-perfect
de-identification, whereas the other better preserves voice
distinctiveness. Solutions based upon the pooling or averaging
of speaker characteristics, as it is the case for the primary
baseline, may lead to losses in voice distinctiveness.
Future work should hence investigate injective voice map-
ping techniques to preserve distinctiveness. However, they will
require careful design since they may jeopardise irreversibility
(voices cannot be re-identified through an inverse transforma-
tion), a key requirement for anonymisation. A compromise so-
lution might be to insure the injectivity for preserving the voice
distinctiveness within a diaglogue session whereas adding non-
injectivity or randomness between the dialogue sessions. Thus
the intra-session mapping could be reversible while the inter-
session mapping could be irreversible. In this case a privacy
adversary would not be able to use data across sessions. Hence,
metrics to the assessment of voice de-identification versus voice
distinctiveness in multi-session must be elaborated in future re-
search.
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